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Getting Information on Independently Prepared Quantum States — When Are
Individual Measurements as Powerful as Joint Measurements?
Chi-Hang Fred Fung and H. F. Chau
Department of Physics and Center of Theoretical and Computational Physics,
University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Given a composite quantum system in which the states of the subsystems are independently (but
not necessarily identically) prepared, we construct separate measurements on the subsystems from
any given joint measurement such that the former always give at least as large information as the
latter. This construction offers new insights into the understanding of measurements on this type
of composite systems. Moreover, this construction essentially proves the intuition that separate
measurements on the subsystems are sufficient to extract the maximal information about the sepa-
rately prepared subsystems, thus making a joint measurement unnecessary. Furthermore, our result
implies that individual attacks are as powerful as collective attacks in obtaining information on the
raw key in quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 87.19.lo, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum states can be used to convey information.
A sender, Alice, may prepare a few quantum particles,
whose states depend on the message itself, and send them
through a quantum channel to the receiver, Bob. To de-
termine the message, Bob performs a quantum measure-
ment on his received quantum states. When the quantum
states live in multiple quantum subsystems, Bob may
perform separate quantum measurements on the subsys-
tems to learn about the message. Alternatively, he may
perform a joint quantum measurement on all subsystems
together. In general, performing separate quantum mea-
surements on the subsystems is not powerful enough to
extract maximal information on the input state. In fact,
the capacities of certain quantum channels [1, 2] and the
maximum information that can be extracted from cer-
tain unentangled but classically correlated states [3] can
only be attained via joint measurements. But what if
each subsystem is independently used to convey infor-
mation? Perhaps measuring each subsystem separately
is already good enough to extract maximum amount of
information on the states in each subsystem. Here we
prove this intuition by explicitly constructing an individ-
ual measurement from a given joint measurement such
that information gain from former is at least as large
as the latter. This construction offers new insights into
the understanding of measurements on this type of com-
posite systems. Furthermore, we explain the operational
meaning of such construction and discuss its implication
to quantum key distribution (QKD).
II. PRECISE DEFINITION OF OUR PROBLEM
Suppose that there are K subsystems. For each sub-
system k, Alice selects a state indexed by ak from a set of
normalized density matrices {φ
(k)
ak } with probability p
(k)
ak .
(In other words, Tr(φ
(k)
ak ) = 1 and
∑
ak
p
(k)
ak = 1. Further-
more, we do not limit the the number of subsystems K,
the Hilbert space dimension of each subsystem and the
number of elements in the set {φ
(k)
ak } for each k. These
three numbers may well be infinite.) The state in each
subsystem is selected independently but not necessarily
identically. Suppose that Bob uses a particular joint pos-
itive operator-valued measure (POVM) to measure the
K subsystems. In general, this POVM may contain el-
ements that are entangled with the K subsystems. The
purpose of this paper is to construct an individual mea-
surement in the K subsystems that can extract no less
Shannon mutual information about Alice’s states than
the original joint POVM. Here individual measurement
refers to the one composed of K independent POVM’s
each operating on one subsystem. Thus, by showing that
such an individual measurement exists, we confirm the in-
tuition that maximal information on separately prepared
subsystems can be extracted separately.
We present two methods for constructing such an indi-
vidual measurement from the original joint measurement.
Both methods draw on the observation that knowing the
states of the other subsystems gives rise to a projected
measurement on a subsystem. The first method is sim-
pler to apply, while the second one admits an intuitive
explanation for why it gives at least as large information
as the original joint measurement. We also provide the
operational meaning for the second method.
III. CONSTRUCTION 1
Without lost of generality, let us consider the case of
having two subsystems (that is, K = 2) and denote the
original joint POVM as {Mb : ∀b}. The case of K > 2
can be constructed and proven in a similar way. The key
idea of constructing the individual measurement is to fo-
cus on measuring one particular subsystem and look at
what effective measurement is performed on it. Thus, let
2us focus, say, on subsystem 1 (S1). If Alice always pre-
pares subsystem 2 (S2) in the state φ, then the effective
measurement on S1 is
{Tr2[(I⊗ φ)Mb] : ∀b}. (1)
More generally, if Alice may prepare the state in S2 in
more than one way, then for each state sent by Alice in
S2, there corresponds a set of POVM elements similar to
Eq. (1). The entire POVM is then composed of all these
sets. One may regard the set of POVM elements corre-
sponding to a state in S2 as the effective measurement
on S1 when Alice sends that state. Therefore, how likely
Bob uses this set of POVM elements should be weighted
by the a priori probability of the corresponding state
being sent. In summary, the effective POVM for S1 is
{M
(1)
b1
: ∀b1} where
M
(1)
b1
= Tr2[(I⊗ φ
(2)
a2
)Mb]p
(2)
a2
, (2)
and b1 ≡ (a2, b) is the index of the POVM element spec-
ifying an input state in S2 and an element of the origi-
nal joint POVM. Using the same argument, the effective
POVM {M
(2)
b2
: ∀b2} for S2 is
M
(2)
b2
= Tr1[(φ
(1)
a1
⊗ I)Mb]p
(1)
a1
(3)
where b2 ≡ (a1, b) is similarly defined.
Theorem 1. Suppose Alice prepares the states of sub-
systems k = 1, 2 independently. Then, the amount of
Shannon mutual information provided by an individual
measurement on the two subsystem using the POVM’s
{M
(k)
bk
}, k = 1, 2 whose elements are given in Eq. (2) and
Eq. (3) is at least as large as the Shannon mutual infor-
mation provided by the original joint POVM {Mb}.
Proof. Let the capitalized symbols A1, A2, and B denote
the random variables for the input states a1 and a2 and
the original joint POVM outcome b, respectively. Since
the two subsystems are independent, the mutual infor-
mation for the original joint POVM {Mb} is given by
I1+2 , I(A1, A2;B) = H(A1, A2)−H(A1, A2|B)
= H(A1) +H(A2)−H(A1, A2|B). (4)
Here, the functions I(·; ·) and H(·) are the mutual in-
formation between its arguments and the entropy of its
argument, respectively. The mutual information between
the input and the output of subsystem k = 1, 2 is
Ik , I(Ak;Bk) = H(Ak)−H(Ak|Bk). (5)
To prove this theorem, it suffices to show that I1 + I2 ≥
I1+2 which can be expressed as
H(B1)−H(A1, B1) +H(B2)−H(A2, B2)
≥H(B)−H(A1, A2, B). (6)
We proceed by establishing a crucial relationship between
the joint probability of the overall system and that of
each subsystem. The former, with inputs A1 and A2 and
output B, is given by
Pr{A1 = a1, A2 = a2, B = b}
=Tr[(φ(1)a1 ⊗ φ
(2)
a2
)Mb]p
(1)
a1
p(2)a2 , (7)
while the latter, with input Ak and output Bk for sub-
system k, is given by
Pr{Ak = ak, Bk = bk} = Tr[φ
(k)
ak
M
(k)
bk
]p(k)ak . (8)
Here, the POVM element M
(k)
bk
is given in Eq. (2) or
Eq. (3). We relate these two probabilities for say S1 by
expanding the POVM element in Eq. (8) as follows:
Pr{A1 = a1, B1 = (a2, b)}
=Tr1[φ
(1)
a1
(Tr2[(I⊗ φ
(2)
a2
)Mb]p
(2)
a2
)]p(1)a1
=Pr{A1 = a1, A2 = a2, B = b}. (9)
This crucial relationship between the probabilities di-
rectly translates into a relationship between the en-
tropies:
H(A1, B1) =
∑
a1,b1
f(Pr{A1 = a1, B1 = b1})
=
∑
a1,(a2,b)
f(Pr{A1 = a1, B1 = (a2, b)})
=
∑
a1,a2,b
f(Pr{A1 = a1, A2 = a2, B = b})
= H(A1, A2, B) (10)
where f(x) = −x log2 x. Replacing S1 by S2, we have
H(A1, B1) = H(A1, A2, B) = H(A2, B2). (11)
By the same token, we know that
H(B1) =
∑
a2,b
f(
∑
a1
Pr{A1 = a1, A2 = a2, B = b})
= H(A2, B) (12)
and
H(B2) = H(A1, B). (13)
From Eqs. (11)-(13), Eq. (6) is reduced to the well-known
entropy inequality in (classical) information theory [4]
H(A1|B) ≥ H(A1|A2, B). (14)
Therefore, this theorem is proved.
3IV. CONSTRUCTION 2
Recall that the effective POVM for each subsystem
(given in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3)) is a mixture of sub-POVM’s
each corresponding to a state sent in the other subsys-
tem. Now the key observation is that Bob can use any
of these sub-POVM’s on one subsystem irrespective of
the actual state sent in the other. That is to say, Bob
can use on S2 the sub-POVM corresponding to one state
in S1 even though Alice has really sent another state in
S1. Therefore, among all sub-POVM’s for a particular
subsystem, we can pick the one that provides the highest
mutual information. This sub-POVM, alone, then con-
stitutes the effective POVM for that subsystem. And this
construction results in the effective POVM {M
(1)
b : ∀b}
for S1 where
M
(1)
b = Tr2[(I⊗ φ
(2)
a2
)Mb], (15)
and φ
(2)
a2 is chosen to be one of the possible states of S2
so that {M
(1)
b } maximizes the mutual information for S1.
Similarly, the elements of the effective POVM {M
(2)
b :
∀b} for S2 are
M
(2)
b = Tr1[(φ
(1)
a1
⊗ I)Mb], (16)
where φ
(1)
a1 is chosen to be one of the possible states of
S1 so that {M
(2)
b } maximizes the mutual information for
S2.
Theorem 2. Suppose Alice prepares the states of sub-
systems S1, S2 independently. Then, the amount of Shan-
non mutual information provided by an individual mea-
surement using the POVM’s whose elements are defined
in Eq. (15) for S1 and in Eq. (16) for S2 is at least as
large as the Shannon mutual information provided by
the original joint POVM {Mb}.
Proof. We focus on S1 as the case of S2 is similar. It suf-
fices to show that the mutual information for the POVM
whose elements are defined in Eq. (15) is no less than
that in Eq. (2), and invoke Theorem 1. Observe that
I(A1;B1) = H(A1)− [H(A1, B1)−H(B1)]
= H(A1)− [H(A1, A2, B)−H(A2, B)]
= H(A1|A2)− [H(A1, B|A2)−H(B|A2)]
=
∑
a2
p(2)a2 I(A1;B|A2 = a2)
≤ max
a2
I(A1;B|A2 = a2), (17)
where the second line is due to Eqs. (11) and (12), and
the third line is due to the fact that the states in the
two subsystems are independent and that one can ar-
bitrarily add and subtract H(A2). We proceed to ver-
ify that I(A1;B|A2 = a2) is indeed the mutual infor-
mation for the sub-POVM consisting of elements given
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(a)Introducing the phantom subsystem P2 in which a joint
measurement is performed on it and the real subsystem S1.
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(b)Alice reveals the state in P2, allowing a projected measurement
to be performed on S1.
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(c)Bob uses the best projected measurement for S1.
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(d)P2 is now superfluous and is discarded.
FIG. 1: Intuitive explanation for Construction 2, focusing
on real subsystem 1 (S1). In each step, the information ob-
tained on S1 is non-decreasing. Here, dark (light) circles rep-
resent real (phantom) subsystems, shaded rectangles repre-
sent measurements, andM ′b(x) = Tr2[(I⊗φ
(2)
x )Mb] represents
the POVM element of the projected measurement.
in Eq. (15). The probability of observing outcome b
with input A1 = a1 corresponding to Eq. (15) equals
Tr1[φ
(1)
a1 (Tr2[(I ⊗ φ
(2)
a2 )Mb])]p
(1)
a1 = Pr{A1 = a1, B =
b|A2 = a2}. This means that the corresponding mutual
information for this POVM is I(A1;B|A2 = a2). There-
fore, Eq. (17) shows that indeed the POVM of Eq. (2)
can be broken down into sub-POVM’s each correspond-
ing to one value of a2. Thus, when Bob always uses
the sub-POVM corresponding to the a2 that maximizes
I(A1;B|A2 = a2), the resulting mutual information is
no less than that of using the weighted average of the
sub-POVM’s.
V. INTUITIVE EXPLANATION OF
CONSTRUCTION 2
Let us introduce two phantom subsystems (intended
to be thrown away later) in addition to the two real sub-
systems. The phantom subsystem Pk serves to replicate
4real subsystem Sk for k = 1, 2 in the sense that they share
the same set of states in which Alice may send with the
same a prior probabilities. Nevertheless, they are inde-
pendent of each other and of other subsystems. Since all
the states sent by Alice in the four subsystems are inde-
pendent, the pair consisting of S1 and S2 and the pair
consisting of S1 and P2 appear to be identical to Bob.
Thus, the amount of information Bob can learn about
S1 from measuring the first pair and that from measur-
ing the second pair using the same joint measurement
must be same. Because of this, we may consider that
Bob performs the joint measurement on S1 and P2 (see
Fig. 1(a)).
Now suppose that Alice tells Bob exactly which state
was sent in P2 (and we will show that delaying this an-
nouncement indefinitely turns out to have no bearing on
Bob). Using this extra piece of information, Bob can
pick the corresponding POVM elements that are consis-
tent with the phantom state and project it onto S1 as
a measurement operator (see Fig. 1(b)). Interestingly,
this projected measurement turns out to be the effec-
tive measurement we have constructed in Eq. (15) for
various values of a2. Essentially, for each state in P2 an-
nounced by Alice, there corresponds an effective POVM
for S1. Clearly, with the aid of the extra information in
the state of P2, Bob’s information on S1 in this case is at
least as large as that could be obtained with the original
joint measurement on the two systems when Alice did
not disclose the state of P2.
Now the key point is that Bob can use any of these
effective POVM’s on S1 irrespective of the actual state
sent in P2. This is because Bob’s information on S1 ob-
tained from using a particular effective POVM does not
depend on the state of P2 as P2 and S1 are independent.
Therefore, we can regard that Bob always ignores Alice’s
announcement of the state in P2 and uses the effective
POVM on S1 that gives him the maximum amount of
information (see Fig. 1(c)). When Bob always uses only
one effective POVM on S1, the existence of P2 is irrele-
vant and thus we can completely discard P2 along with
the announcement of its state (see Fig. 1(d)). Since Bob
always uses the best effective POVM on S1, the amount
of information he gets on S1 is at least as large as that
when he chooses the POVM based on Alice’s announce-
ment, which we have already argued is no worse than
that when he uses the original joint measurement.
We repeat the previous argument on the pair S2 and
P1 to obtain the best effective POVM for S2. Finally,
the independence of S1 and S2 allows us to conclude that
using the best effective POVM for each of them gives no
less information on both as the original joint POVM.
VI. MULTIPARTITE SYSTEMS
Our results for the bipartite case given by Theorems 1
and 2 can easily be extended to the multipartite case (in-
cluding the case of an infinite number of subsystems). In
particular, the POVM elements corresponding to Theo-
rem 1 for a K-partite system are
M
(k)
bk
= Trℓ 6=k
[
K⊗
ℓ=1
φ(ℓ,k)aℓ Mb
]∏
ℓ 6=k
p(ℓ)aℓ ∀k, (18)
where φ
(ℓ,k)
aℓ = φ
(ℓ)
aℓ if ℓ 6= k and φ
(ℓ,k)
aℓ = I otherwise.
VII. IMPLICATION TO QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
The result in this paper sheds some light on the var-
ious types of eavesdropping attacks in QKD [5, 6]. In
most QKD protocols such as the famous BB84 proto-
col [5], a legitimate party (Alice) sends a sequence of
quantum states each independently chosen from a set of
states to another legitimate party (Bob) through a hos-
tile channel controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve). The
goal of Alice and Bob is to derive a secret key from Al-
ice’s states and Bob’s states. Eve, on the other hand,
attempts to steal their secret by launching an eavesdrop-
ping attack. Two types of keys can be distinguished:
the raw key and the final secret key. Alice’s raw key is
the bit string corresponding to the quantum states she
sends to Bob; whereas Bob’s raw key corresponds to his
measurement results on the received qubits[17]. Their
raw keys may not be secure and error-free; and they
derive their final keys from their raw keys via privacy
amplification. For QKD protocols in which Alice sends
out independent states (such as BB84 [5], SARG04 [7],
and Gaussian-modulated coherent states QKD [8]), Eve’s
probes become independent and our result in this paper
implies that individual attacks are as powerful as col-
lective attacks in obtaining information on Alice’s raw
key[18]. In contrast, Smith [9] shows that when the
key generation rate is concerned, collective attacks are
strictly more powerful. This makes sense since privacy
amplification correlates Alice’s raw keys in order to ob-
tain the final secret key.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We show that individual measurement is sufficient to
obtain optimal amount of information on the states in
which each subsystem is prepared independently but not
necessary identically based on the observation that know-
ing the state of the other subsystems gives rise to a pro-
jected measurement on a subsystem. Applying our result
to the QKD setting shows that individual and collective
attacks are equally powerful in obtaining information on
the raw key. Our work uses Shannon mutual information
as the information measure.
We note that Wootters has proved the same result as
ours that the accessible information is additive for in-
5dependently prepared subsystems [10]. However, imple-
menting his proof idea will result in an ensemble of in-
dividual measurements (each with a fixed probability of
being drawn) for each subsystem. In contrast, both our
construction methods lead to a single measurement for
each subsystem.
Constructing individual measurements from a joint one
giving at least as large information in terms of other in-
formation measures may be possible. For example, the
Csisza´r measure (see, e.g., [11, 12]), which is a generaliza-
tion of Shannon information, allows such a construction
in a special case[19].
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